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Achieving security in wireless sensor network is a challenging problem 
due to the inherent resource and computing constraints. Several key distribution 
techniques have been proposed in the technical literature for efficient distribution 
of keys to the nodes prior deployment. These techniques establish secure links 
for some pairs of physically connected nodes but leave other pairs alone. 
Remaining nodes use multi-hop scheme to form a secured path connecting these 
links. Using this technique, the  secret is disclosed to all the nodes on the path.  
Therefore, if any of the nodes are compromised by an adversary, secret is 
disclosed to the adversary. To solve this problem, a scheme called Babel was 
proposed recently that finds common bridge node to deliver secret link keys to 
their neighbors. In this scheme regular paths are used to deliver multiple keys 
with the common bridge node, hence key compromise probability is lowered 
compared to previous techniques. Our work is based on the Babel scheme and 
has several advantages. In our work we propose a new scheme that finds 
multiple bridge nodes to deliver secret link keys to all its physical neighbors. Keys 
are distributed to multiple bridge nodes instead of one common bridge node to 
establish secure connections to the disconnected nodes. Hence even if a few of 
the bridge nodes are compromised, secret will not be disclosed to the adversary. 
  
We present the details of our scheme’s design and investigate the connectivity 
and security performance of our scheme in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
I.1 Wireless Networks 
 Wireless network is associated with telecommunications network where 
terminals, nodes and links are connected together to enable communications 
among the users of the terminals without the use of wires. Driven by pressure to 
ease mobile computing, everyone is plunging into wireless networking [1]. 
Wireless networking makes the data portable, mobile and accessible. Moving 
data over wireless networks involve radio signals, data format and network 
structure. In a wireless network, the network interface adapters in each computer 
and base station convert digital data to radio signals, which they transmit to other 
devices on the same network, and they receive and convert incoming radio 
signals from other network elements back to digital data [2].  
Wireless networking proves to be very useful in public places where one 
might find wireless access to the Internet. Quality of Service (QoS) is not 
guaranteed in wireless network because if there is any interference with the link 
the connection may be dropped. Different types of wireless networks available 
are Wide area networks (WAN), Local area networks (LAN), Personal area 
networks (PAN), Metropolitan area networks (MAN) and Mobile device networks.  
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I.1.1 Mobile ad-hoc Networks 
 Ad-hoc networks are a key in the evolution of wireless networks [3]. 
Wireless networks are adopted to enable mobility [4]. They are a collection of two 
or more devices equipped with wireless communications and network capability. 
Such devices can communicate with another node that is immediately within their 
radio range or one that is outside their radio range [5]. They eliminate the final 
limitation of the traditional cellular and mobile networks in sense of infrastructure. 
These kinds of networks are self organizing and adaptive. They are comprised of 
equal nodes that communicate over the wireless links without any central control. 
They inherit traditional problems of both mobile and wireless communications. 
The highly dynamic nature of a mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) results in rapid 
and unpredictable change of the topology over time. The routes among the 
nodes in an ad-hoc network may include multiple hops and hence it is 
appropriate to call such networks “multi-hop wireless ad-hoc networks” [4]. 
Transmitting data in MANET is based on the RTS/CTS control sequence used by 
the popular IEEE 802.11. Short control frame named RTS, is sent from source 
station to the receiving station to announce the upcoming frame transmission. On 
receiving the RTS frame the destination station replies by a CTS frame to show 
that it is ready to receive the data frame. Both the RTS and CTS frames contain 
the total duration of the transmission that is the overall time needed to transmit 
the data frame and the related ACK. This information can be read by any station 
within the transmission range of either the source or the destination station. 
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Hence a station becomes aware of a transmission from a hidden station and the 
length of time the channel will be used for transmission [4]. As mobile ad-hoc 
networks rely on battery power or other exhaustible devices power consumption 
becomes a critical issue. 
I.1.2 Wireless Sensor Networks 
 Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are an increasingly attractive means to bridge 
the gap between the physical and virtual world [6]. They are one form of an ad hoc 
wireless network. Recently these networks are drawing considerable attention because 
they are crucial for the digital battlefield. These networks will consist of hundreds or 
thousands of self-organizing, low-power, low cost wireless nodes deployed to monitor 
and affect the environment [7].  These sensor nodes are very minute in size which makes 
them hard to detect and destroy by the enemies. 
 Sensor nodes are densely deployed in multiple locations and helps in gathering 
the sensory information required by the smart environments. They use their processing 
and computational abilities to transmit only the required and processed data instead of 
sending the raw data to the nodes. They can be easily installed and maintained.  
 WSNs generally consist of data acquisition network and data distribution network 
monitored and controlled by a management center [8]. These messages will be 
received and transmitted over the wireless links. These links can be formed by radio, 
infrared or optical medium [9].  
 Quality of service (QoS) which can be specified in terms of message delay, bit 
error rates, packet loss, economic cost of transmission, transmission power, etc is the 
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basic issue while designing the network topology for transmission of the messages. One 
unique feature of sensor nodes are its cooperative effort. Due to its features WSNs are 
used in wide range of applications such as military applications, habitat monitoring, 
environmental observations, health care and other commercial applications where 
nodes can be captured by an adversary. 
 
 
 
 
                        Figure. I.1 Typical wireless sensor network [8] 
 
 
 
 
 
I.2 Security in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 Sensor networks are typically characterized by limited power supplies, low 
bandwidth, small memory size and limited energy which leads to a very demanding 
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environment to provide security [7]. Also due to its broadcast nature WSNs are vulnerable 
to security attacks. Immediate concerns for wireless communications are device 
theft, denial of service, malicious hackers, malicious code, theft of service, 
industrial and foreign espionage [10]. As they increased popularity demand for 
effective security mechanisms also increased. Physical attacks by the adversaries are the 
most prominent security issues in WSNs. There is no fixed infrastructure for the 
management of the sensor networks hence security became more difficult.  
 Security requirements of a wireless sensor networks are data confidentiality, 
data integrity, data freshness, availability, self organization, time synchronization, secure 
localization and authentication [11]. To protect the sensitive data during the 
communication between the nodes security keys are distributed to each node. Lack of 
trusted servers nearby (for public/private key schemes), secret key schemes 
may be more viable to protect such communications [12].  
 Several mechanisms were proposed for security in wireless sensor 
networks. However there is no technique everyone accepts with regardless of 
the network. Few of them were applied in some environments and research is 
still going on actively for future solutions. 
I.3 Related Work 
 As physical topology of WSNs is unknown before deployment the only 
option for distribution of keys to sensor nodes are key pre-distribution. Keys 
must be installed in sensor nodes before deployment for secure connectivity 
among nodes.  
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 Traditional key pre-distribution offers two solutions 1) single mission key 
2) set of separate n-1 keys. Both solutions are inadequate because in single 
mission key same key is installed in all the nodes and hence if one of the 
sensor node is compromised the entire network will be compromised and in set 
of separate n-1 keys each sensor node must be installed with n-1 keys each 
being pair-wise privately shared with another node. This solution is impractical 
in large networks because memory dedicated for storing n-1 keys for each 
sensor network may not be sufficient and addition or deletion of the sensor 
nodes would become more expensive and complex. 
 In 2002, Eschenauer and Gligor proposed a simple key pre-distribution 
scheme that requires memory storage for only few tens to a couple of hundred 
keys, and yet has similar security and superior operational properties when 
compared to those of the pair-wise private key-sharing scheme [13]. In this 
scheme ring of keys are distributed to each sensor node. As the key ring is 
chosen randomly from large pool of keys some pair of nodes may not have a 
shared key. Such nodes deliver secrets using multi-hop path scheme where the 
secret is disclosed to all the nodes on the path. Hence if one of node on the 
path is compromised, the secret is disclosed to the adversary.   
 In 2007, Jing Deng and Yunghsiang S.Han proposed Babel Scheme that 
finds a common bridge node to deliver secret link keys to establish secure 
communication with the nodes which are not connected. The common bridge 
node will be the only node other than the source and the receiving nodes 
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knowing the secrets [12]. Hence the chance of secret disclosure is small 
compared to previous techniques but if the common bridge node is 
compromised the secrets of all the nodes which do not share keys with the 
source node will be disclosed to the adversary. 
I.4 Our Approach 
 Our scheme is to deliver multiple keys with the use of multiple common 
bridge nodes. In the Babel scheme [12] there is only one common bridge node 
which shares keys with all the disconnected nodes but in this scheme there are 
multiple bridge nodes to share keys with nodes those are not connected. This 
scheme lowers the compromise probability compared to other techniques as 
this does not disclose secrets of all the nodes on its path to the adversary. Thus 
this technique can be used in the networks where the communication with all 
the physical neighbors need to be done securely. 
I.5 Problem Formulation 
 The objective of the proposed work is to improve security aspect in 
wireless sensor networks using the technique of multiple bridge nodes. The 
chapters in this paper is organized in the following manner.   
§ Chapter I introduces the background of wireless networks and 
importance for its security.  
§ Chapter II explains various techniques proposed for the security in 
WSNs. 
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§ Chapter III describes the multiple bridge nodes secret delivery technique 
in detail.  
§ Chapter IV shows the performance evaluation of our scheme with the 
simulation results. 
§ Chapter V ends with the conclusion and future work. 
§ Appendix A provides the code of our simulations. 
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CHAPTER II 
VARIOUS SECURITY MECHANISMS 
II.1 Key Pre-distribution in Wireless Sensor Networks 
 Key management is one of the fundamental building blocks of security 
services and is also a challenging problem in sensor networks. To solve this 
problem several key pre-distribution schemes have been proposed [14]. 
 Eschenauer and Gligor first proposed a random key pre-distribution 
scheme in wireless sensor networks [13] which is known as the basic scheme. 
Let P be the large pool of keys generated and k be the number of keys 
randomly chosen from P keys forming a key ring. This scheme has the three 
different phases. In the first phase knew as key pre-distribution, before sensor 
nodes are deployed k keys are stored into the sensor memory for each node. 
Each pair of nodes establishes a secure connection if they share at least one 
common key with a chosen probability.  
After the sensor nodes are deployed shared-key discovery phase is 
performed. In this phase nodes find out which of its neighbors share a key. 
When the nodes discover that they share a key with its neighbor then that key 
establishes a direct link between two nodes. After shared-key discovery phase 
is complete, a connected graph with secured links is formed in path-key 
establishment phase. Some pair of nodes may not share a key then these 
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nodes set up path keys by it’s securely connected neighbors. In this way key 
can be sent through the path from the source node to the targeted node 
securely. 
 Chan, Perrig and Song reviewed the approach in basic scheme and 
proposed three new mechanisms [15]. First in q-composite random key pre-
distribution scheme q common keys are needed from their key rings instead of 
single common key as in [13] to establish a secure link. As the amount of 
required keys increases it becomes harder for an attacker to break the link. 
Next in multi-path key reinforcement scheme security of an established link is 
strengthened through multiple paths. The basic idea of this scheme was 
explored by Anderson and Perrig [16]. For suppose we have a secure link from 
A to B after key-setup, their approach is to find out multiple paths from A to B 
where each path may have h hops or less. Suppose j be the number of disjoint 
paths from A to B. A then generates j random values which have same length 
as the encryption/decryption key. A then routes each random value along a 
different path to B. When B received all j keys then new link key can be 
computed by both A and B. In this way much more security is provided for the 
links.  
Finally in the last scheme random pairwise keys, a modification to basic 
pairwise keys scheme is done where not all n-1 keys need to be stored in the 
node’s key ring to have a connected graph with high probability. To achieve 
high probability p in a network with n nodes each node need to store a 
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random set of np pairwise keys instead of n-1 keys. This scheme is beneficial 
over purely random keys chosen from a given pool because this gives node-
node authentication properties where each nodes hold some key k, also stores 
the identity (ID) of other node which also holds k. Hence both nodes will be 
certain of the identity of one another when k is used to create a secure link with 
another node since no other nodes can hold k. This provides improved security, 
since any captured node reveals no information about links in which it is not 
directly involved [14]. 
Du, Deng, Han and Varshney proposed a new key pre-distribution 
scheme [17] which substantially improves the resilience of the network 
compared to the existing schemes [13, 15]. This scheme is built on Bloom’s key 
pre-distribution scheme [18] and combines with the random key pre-distribution 
method. In [18], Bloom proposed a key pre-distribution scheme which uses only 
λ+1 memory spaces to find a secret pairwise key between any pair of nodes. 
Compared to N in (N-1) pairwise key pre-distribution scheme λ is much smaller. 
While an adversary compromises less than or equal to λ nodes, 
uncompromised nodes are secure and when adversary compromises more 
than λ nodes then all pairwise keys of the entire network is compromised. 
Blom’s scheme uses one key space for all the nodes in which any pair 
can compute its pairwise key in this key space whereas the new scheme uses 
multiple key spaces. Du et. al. construct ω spaces using Blom’s scheme and 
each sensor node carries key information from Γ (2 ≤ Γ ≤ ω) randomly selected 
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key spaces. Pairwise key can be computed if two nodes carry key information 
from a common space and when two nodes do not carry key information from a 
common space they can compute their pairwise key via other nodes which 
share keys with them. This scheme is more resilient than Blom’s scheme and 
other key pre-distribution schemes because it uses same amount of memory. 
Liu and Ning [19] also developed similar method based on polynomial-based 
key pre-distribution [20].  
II.2 Key Distribution Using Deployment Knowledge  
 In all the previous key pre-distribution schemes no deployment 
knowledge is available. Although they proposed viable solutions they have not 
exploited information that significantly improves their performance. This new 
scheme proposed by Du, Deng, Han, Chen, Varshney [21] shows that the 
knowledge regarding the actual non-uniform sensor deployment can help us 
improve the performance of a key pre-distribution scheme. In wireless sensor 
networks secure communications are done only between the neighboring nodes 
hence the knowledge about the nodes that are likely to be the neighbors of 
each node benefits the key pre-distribution scheme. Due to the randomness of 
the deployment knowing the exact set of neighbors of each node becomes 
unrealistic but we can know the set of possible or likely neighbors for each 
node. This scheme uses random key pre-distribution in [13] and exploits the 
deployment knowledge. Deployment knowledge can be modeled using 
probability density functions (pdfs). Due to the deployment knowledge the first 
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phase in basic key pre-distribution differs and the last two phases remain the 
same.  
 We presume that the sensor nodes are evenly divided into t * n 
groups Gi,j, for i=1,…,t, and j=1,…,n. Presume that the global key pool is S with 
size |S| and also presume that the deployment points are arranged in a grid. 
Each node carries m keys. In first phase called key pre-distribution, before 
deploying the sensor nodes the key pool S is divided into t*n key pools Si,j (for 
i=1,…,t and j=1,…,n), with Si,j corresponding with the deployment group Gi,j. 
Setting up key pool Si,j will allow the nearby key pools to share more keys and 
far away from one another share less keys. After key pool set up each sensor 
node in deployment group Gi,j, randomly selects m keys from its corresponding 
key pool Si,j, and load those keys into the memory of the node [21]. The secure 
links between nodes i and j can be found using flooding [22]. Key- sharing 
graph G may have isolated components which do not have secure links. Hence 
global connectivity of the graph G is measured. Global connectivity can be 
estimated using Erdos random graph theorem [23] when node distribution and 
key sharing are uniform. Since node distribution and key sharing is not uniform 
this theorem will not be a good estimation. Recently, Shakkottai and et. al. have 
determined the connectivity of a wireless sensor grid network with unreliable 
nodes [24]. Hence using deployment knowledge each node needs to carry only 
a fraction of keys compared to other key pre-distribution schemes but achieves 
same level of connectivity. This scheme reduces the memory requirement and 
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substantially improves network resilience against node capture.  
II.3 Key Distribution for Mobile Computing  
 Several other key distribution schemes have been introduced for mobile 
computing. Tatebayashi, Matsuzaki, and New-man proposed a key distribution 
protocol suitable for digital mobile communications [25]. In this scheme a public 
key cryptosystem is employed for uplink channels (from an user terminal to a 
network center) making the mobile communication free from key management 
problems. High speed performance is enabled at hardware-limited terminals by 
employing secret key cryptosystem for downlink channels (from a network 
center to the user terminal). This scheme introduces a structure in the 
transmitted data and a mechanism checking the replay attack to avoid a 
protocol failure based on multiplicative property of the RSA cryptography [26].  
 This work is further improved by Park et al. in [27] and proposed an 
encryption algorithm of an attack based on the algebraic properties. Although it 
suggests an improved protocol S has a shared secret with all parties in repaired 
protocols hence public key cryptography is not justified here. Various other key 
agreement and authentication protocols specifically designed for the use in 
mobile applications have been proposed in [28, 29, 30, 31]. A survey was made 
on most prominent security protocols proposed for mobile applications in [32] 
based on security, suitability and optimization. Zhou and Hass [33] proposed a 
secure key management service in an ad hoc networking environment. This 
scheme proposed threshold cryptography to distribute trust between a set of 
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servers. Kong et al. proposed a certificate based authentication approach 
based on asymmetric cryptographic defacto standard RSA [34]. They proposed 
localized public-key infrastructure mechanisms, based on secret sharing 
schemes. 
II.4 Path Key Establishment  
 Path key establishment has been introduced in [35]. In the key pre-
distribution schemes communications among end nodes are exposed to 
intermediate nodes along the path. In [35] multiple node-disjoint secure paths are 
used to establish the path key which decreases the risk of path key being 
revealed. Further Li et al. [36] proposed multiple one-hop paths instead of node 
disjoint paths to enhance the security of path key establishment. Traynor et al. 
proposed to use a few more powerful sensors to achieve key establishment [37]. 
Deng and Han proposed a scheme [38] to address the problem of compromised 
sensors modifying and eavesdropping the information passing through such 
multi-hop paths. They use MDS codes to develop the IRT scheme to provide 
protection for information delivery. Another multi-path pairwise key establishment 
scheme was proposed to counter Byzantine [39] attacks due to packet dropping 
and cheating [40]. This scheme can tolerates upto t faulty paths among the 
communication pairs. 
In all the previous techniques there are still some local links which are not 
connected securely. This is because an extremely high local connectivity (on the 
security plane) would mean higher vulnerability and lower network resilience. 
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Hence Deng and Han [12] proposed a new scheme called Babel which focuses 
on delivering secret link keys from a source to multiple neighbors. This new 
technique called Babel is used to find a common bridge node to deliver secret 
link keys to these nodes which are disconnected. This scheme uses regular 
paths and delivers multiple keys using the common bridge nodes. As the 
delivered keys are disclosed only to one node the common bridge node unlike 
key pre-distribution scheme which discloses keys to all the nodes on the path, 
key compromise capability is lower compared to other delivery techniques. 
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CHAPTER III 
MULTIPLE-BRIDGE SECRET DELIVERY TECHNIQUE 
III.1 Design of the Proposed Scheme 
 
 
Figure III.1 Illustration of secure connectivity around node S. 
 
 
 The problem of delivering multiple secret link keys to the neighbor nodes 
are illustrated in the Fig. III.1. Here node S is the source node having several 
physical neighbors A, B, C, D, E, F and G clockwise. The solid lines in Fig. III.1 
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represents secure connectivity between the nodes as they share common keys. 
Hence links S-A, S-D and S-F are connected on security plane. Dotted lines 
represent physical connectivity as they do not share any common keys. Hence 
links S-B, S-C,S-E and S-G are disconnected on security plane. These nodes B, 
C,E and G are termed “to-be-connected neighbors”, Ntbc. Nodes Z1, Z2 and Z3 
are bridge nodes relatively far from the neighborhood but share keys with the 
source node S and some of the to-be-connected neighbors. 
We use the following notations and variables in our scheme. 
TTL: Predefined number of hops for the request message to travel; 
P: Large pool of Keys; 
m: Number of keys carried by each node; 
N: Total number of nodes in the network; 
S: Source node; 
BN: Bridge Nodes; 
Zi: Multiple bridge nodes where 1≤i<N;  
Ntbc: Set of to-be-connected neighbors of S; 
Ki,t: Keys on node i, i∈{S} â  Ntbc, 1≤ t ≤ m; 
Xc: Compromise Capability of the nodes; 
Xp: Probability of to-be-connected neighbors being compromised. 
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III.2 Operational Details of the Proposed Scheme 
 Main idea of our scheme is to find multiple bridge nodes that share keys 
with the source node and some of the to-be-connected neighbors. Its purpose is 
to deliver multiple secret link keys to the to-be-connected neighbors with lower 
compromise probability. Fig. III.1 is an example of Multiple Bridge secret delivery 
technique. Suppose S needs to send secret to one of the to-be-connected 
neighbors (B, C, E or G) it will collect Message Authentication Codes (MACs) of 
a challenge message based on each of the keys in KS, KB, KC, KE and KG. This 
information is broadcasted over the network which is control-flooded. Each node 
compares the MACs of the message based on the carried keys and responds if it 
shares a key with the source node and some of the to-be-connected neighbors. 
The reply will be the response to all the challenges with the shared key. For 
suppose, node Z1, Z2 and Z3 satisfies the above condition then they will respond 
and serve as bridge nodes. In our example we a have three bridge nodes which 
share keys with the source node S and atleast one of the to-be-connected 
neighbors. The shared keys with Ntbc could be same or different. Each to-be- 
connected neighbor may have more than one bridge node. So it may have 
different paths to share the secret link keys. Hence if one path is compromised 
the secret will not be disclosed to the adversary. For example node S wants to 
share secret with G, it has the two bridge nodes Z1 and Z3. If Z1 gets 
compromised still the secret link key can be sent through Z3. Also as Z2 does not 
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carry keys of all the to-be-connected neighbors the entire network will not be 
compromised if one of the bridge node is hacked. This way the message 
transmission can be done more securely. 
 Nodes which do not share keys forward the message with their ID 
attached at the end of the message. The message may travel only upto certain 
number of hops (TTL) and will be discarded when it has been forwarded TTL 
times. When node S receives response from Zi it sends the message to the to-
be-connected neighbors. Each to-be-connected neighbor validates the keys sent 
by S and ensures if Zi share key with itself. After that, node S sends secret link 
keys for the nodes B, C, E and G to their corresponding Zi. In our example we 
can see that Z1 shares keys with node B and G. Later the bridge node says Z1 
encrypts the secret link key of nodes B and G and sends it back to node S. Then 
S sends the encrypted key to their corresponding to-be-connected neighbors 
which decrypt the secret link keys. As the messages are sent using shared keys 
the chances for the secret to be disclosed is very low. We will investigate the 
effect of this scheme in Chapter IV. 
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CHAPTER IV 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 We performed simulations in Matlab to investigate our scheme. Our 
simulations mainly focused on finding the multiple bridge nodes and probability of 
secrets being disclosed. We used simplified circular connectivity model and 
focused on key sharing among the nodes hence other simulators such as ns2 or 
OPNET are unnecessary at this stage. N number of nodes are randomly 
deployed in a network size 1000 meters by 1000 meters. Radio transmission 
range is assumed to be 200 meters. Different m (from 2 to 40)number of keys are 
randomly chosen from a pool of P=2000 keys and distributed to each sensor 
node. A source node will look for bridge nodes within a time-to-live (TTL) hop and 
TTL=2. These system parameters remain the same throughout this work unless 
mentioned otherwise. 
 In our evaluation, we first study  the availability of multiple bridge nodes in 
different network set ups. We also look for the neighbors and to-be-connected 
neighbors for the source node S. Then we investigate the probability of to-be-
connected neighbors compromised for security analysis. Here we define BN as 
the total number of bridge nodes. 
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IV.1 Availability of Bridge Nodes 
 We investigate the availability of Multiple Bridge nodes in this section. First 
we run simulation for different N values. We assumed source node to be the N-th 
node (note that all nodes are randomly placed in the network). 
 
 
 
Figure IV.1: Number of bridge nodes as a function of memory size comparing 
different node densities. 
 
 
From the figure IV.1 we can see that, as the number of nodes (N) increases, the 
total number of common bridge nodes (BN) also increases. This is because the 
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number of to-be-connected neighbors increases with N so probability of finding 
the bridge nodes also increases. We can see that number of bridge nodes 
remained constant at nearly m=40. This is because number of bridge nodes 
reached the maximum value. From figure IV.2 we can observe that at m=2-14 we 
can find only less bridge nodes and from figure IV.1 we can see that at m>30  
bridge nodes reached maximum value. From both these figures we can conclude 
that m=15-20 is enough to find the bridge nodes 
 
 
 
Figure IV.2: Number of bridge nodes as a function of memory size comparing 
different node densities for lower m. 
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Figure IV.3: Number of bridge nodes for TTL=3 as a function of memory size 
comparing different node densities. 
 
 
 
 
Figure IV.3 shows the simulation results for TTL=3. From the figure we 
can see that as m value increased BN value also increased because keys carried 
by each node increases. Thus it increases the probability of finding the bridge 
node which share keys with the source node and some of the to-be-connected 
neighbors. We observed at nearly m=40 BN reached maximum value for TTL=3. 
But we do not need so many bridge nodes hence when m is close to 40 we only 
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need to look for TTL=1 or 2.  
 
 
Figure IV.4: Number of Bridge nodes for N=100 as a function of memory size 
comparing different pool of keys. 
 
 
From the figure IV.4 we can see that as P value increased the number of bridge 
nodes also increased. We can observe that when P=2000 number of bridge 
nodes raised slowly from zero but when P=4000 rise of BN is very small and is 
almost constant with increase of m value. Hence we can take large P and small 
m value for better performance but large P value decreases the physical 
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connectivity of the network. Therefore optimum P value should be small.  
 
 
 
Figure IV.5: Number of nodes for P=2000 as a function of memory size 
comparing different node densities. 
 
 
 
To find the availability of bridge nodes it’s also important to know how 
many neighbors and to-be-connected neighbors a source node has. This can be 
shown in the figure IV.5. Here we can see that as number of nodes N doubled 
total number of neighbors and to-be-connected neighbors also doubled. We can 
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also see the decrease in the to-be-connected neighbors with the increase in the 
m value. It becomes zero for large m. This is because if a node carries more 
keys then probability of finding the shared keys increases. This increases the  
physical connectivity between the nodes. Hence there will be none to-be-
connected neighbors and finding bridge nodes will be unnecessary at this point.. 
Number of neighbors remained almost constant with increase in m value even 
when the network topology is changed for each simulation run. From this we can 
understand that for any kind of network finding the neighbors remain same for 
same N and S. 
It’s also interesting to know the number of to-be-connected neighbors of a 
source. Here M=i shows that the bridge nodes share keys with source node S 
and i number of the to-be-connected neighbors. From the figure IV.6 we can see 
that when M=1 and M=2 number of bridge nodes increased after certain m value 
but when M=3 and M=4 they are almost zero for lower m. This is because when 
memory size is small number of shared keys among the nodes are low. Thus it 
decreases the probability of finding bridge nodes sharing keys with more number 
of to-be-connected neighbors.  
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Figure IV.6: Number of bridge nodes for N=50 as a function of memory size 
comparing different M values. 
 
 
 
Comparing figure IV.7 with figure IV.6 we can see that number of to-be-
connected neighbors sharing keys with the bridge nodes increased when N=100. 
We are not interested at m>40 so if we observe both the figures for  m=20, we 
can see the BN value is almost same for M=3 and M=4 in both the figures but it 
increased for M=1 and M=2 in figure IV.7. From these figures we can say that at 
optimum m value BN has less number of to-be-connected neighbors.    
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Figure IV.7: Number of bridge nodes for N=100 as a function of memory size 
comparing different M values. 
 
 
 
Figure IV.8 compares number of bridge nodes for different hop count. When 
TTL=2,3,4 and 5 rise in m value increases the number of bridge nodes. When 
m=20 we can observe that BN value differs only a little for TTL=2,3,4 and 5. 
From this we can understand that for lower m value hop count does not matter 
for finding the bridge nodes. But if we increase the m value then we need to 
reduce the hop count to find the bridge nodes.  
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Figure IV.8: Number of bridge nodes for N=100 as a function of memory size 
comparing different hops. 
 
 
 
IV.2 Security Analysis 
 In the previous section we found the availability of bridge nodes for 
sharing secret link keys in different network topologies. In this section we 
investigate the number of to-be-connected nodes compromised in the entire 
network as some of the  nodes are randomly chosen as compromise. We also 
analyze percentage of the to-be-connected nodes compromised for different 
compromise capability. From this analysis we can find out the secure level of our 
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scheme. Here we define xp as the ratio of number of the bridge nodes 
compromised to the total number of bridge nodes for each to-be-connected 
neighbors. xc is assumed to be the compromise capability of the node. m=20, 
P=2000 and TTL=2 in this section. 
Figure IV.9 compares the number of to-be-connected neighbors 
compromised for different N and xc values. From the figure we can see that 
number of to-be-connected neighbors compromised increases for N=200 than in 
N=100. Here xp>0.3 indicates that if more than 30% of the bridge nodes sharing 
keys with particular to-be-connected neighbor are compromised then that  to-be-
connected neighbor is said to be compromised. We can see that at N=100 for 
different xp values the to-be-connected neighbors compromised varied slightly 
but at N=200 it shows much difference. From these two observations we can say 
that the network is more secure at lower N value when the absolute numbers of 
compromised bridge nodes are concerned. 
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Figure IV.9: Number of to-be-connected neighbors compromised as a function of 
xc. 
 
 
 
Figure IV.10 shows the percentage of to-be-connected neighbors compromised 
for different node compromise capability. This figure shows that at xp > 0.3, 
percentage of to-be-connected neighbors compromised is more than xp > 0.5. 
This is because finding compromised to-be-connected neighbors is less when we 
say a node is compromised only when the percentage of bridge nodes 
compromised is more. Hence for the network to be more secure  xp should be  
high but it cannot have very large value. Note that xp value is a system parameter 
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to be determined by how the key is encoded.  
 
 
 
Figure IV.10: Percentage of to-be-connected neighbors compromised as a 
function of xc. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Security is an important aspect in wireless sensor networks as they are 
crucial for the digital battlefield. Hence keys are used for encryption and 
authentication purposes between the communicating nodes. Many key 
agreement schemes have been investigated but unsuitable for wireless sensor 
networks. Lately several key pre-distribution schemes were proposed but they 
focused only on the connectivity of physical neighbors. 
To overcome this problem we proposed “Multiple Bridge secret delivery 
scheme” to deliver secret link keys to the to-be-connected neighbors in wireless 
sensor networks. As the source node does not share keys with all its neighbors 
this scheme uses multiple bridge nodes to share keys with the source node and 
some of the to-be-connected neighbors. We designed this scheme for secure 
communication between the nodes. 
 In our performance evaluation we have observed that probability of finding 
bridge nodes increased with increased number of nodes. On the other hand it 
decreases the percentage of to-be-connected neighbors being compromised. 
Hence for a secure network, number of nodes compromised must be low and the 
capacity of the to-be-connected neighbor being compromised must be high when 
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number of bridge nodes compromised for each to-be-connected neighbor 
increased. We also observed that, distributing large number of keys to each node 
is unnecessary because the number of bridge nodes remained the same but this 
requires larger memory space, a precious resource. We also observed that 
number of to-be-connected neighbors sharing keys with the bridge nodes 
increased with increased N and m value. Network can be more secure when Ntbc 
is high for the bridge nodes because it increases the paths to deliver secret link 
keys. So if one of the paths is compromised we will still have other paths to send 
secrets.  
 In our future work, we will investigate the proposed scheme under more 
realistic network environments. For example, nodes might be compromised in a 
region instead of randomly throughout the network. The performance of our 
scheme may be affected by such a compromise model. Furthermore, we have 
not studied the effect of node mobility. Moving nodes may change the 
connectivity and security connection as well. 
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APPENDIX A 
SIMULATION CODE 
 
A.1 Network Setup 
N=100; % Number of nodes 
R=200; % Transmission range 
P=2000; % Pool of keys 
M=50 % Number of keys 
% -----------Randomly distribute the nodes-------------% 
X=1000*rand ( 1, N );  
Y=1000*rand ( 1, N ); 
% --------------------Neighbor matrix-----------------------% 
for i=1:N 
for j=1:N 
D ( i, j )=sqrt ( ( x(j) - x(i) )^2+( y (j)- y(i) ) ^2 ); % Distance between the nodes 
If ( D ( i, j ) > 0 && D ( i ,j ) < R) 
NB ( i, j )=1; 
else 
NB ( i, j )=0; 
end  
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end  
end  
% --------------------Neighbors of Source Node-----------------------% 
NB_S=zeros (1, N ); 
for i=N % Source Node 
for j=1:N-1 
if (NB ( i ,j ) == 1 ) 
NB_S ( j )=1; 
end 
end 
end 
% --------------------TTL-----------------------% 
for TTL=1:3 
for i=1:N-1 
if(NB_S ( i )==TTL) 
for j=1:N-1 
if(NB ( i ,j )==1 && NB_S ( j )==0) 
NB_S ( j )=TTL+1; 
end 
end 
end 
end 
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end 
A.2 Key Distribution 
Keys = zeros ( N, M ); 
for I = 1:N 
temp = randperm(P); % Randomly distribute keys from Pool of keys 
for j=1:M 
Keys ( i, j ) = temp ( j ); 
end 
end 
% -------------------- Shared Neighbors-----------------------% 
k1=1; 
for i=1:N-1 
if (NB_S(i) ==1) 
temp1=intersect ( Keys ( i, : ), Keys ( N, :) );  
t( k1) = numel ( temp1 ); 
if (t ( k1 ) > 0) 
SN ( i ) = 1; 
else 
SN ( i ) = 0; 
end 
k1 = k1+1; 
end 
 
 
43 
 
end 
% -------------------- To-be-Connected Neighbors-----------------------% 
for i=1:N-1 
if ( NB_S (i) == 1 && SN (i) == 0 ) 
TN ( i ) =1;  
elseif (NB_S (i)==1 && SN (i)==1) 
TN ( i )=0; 
else 
TN ( i )=0; 
end 
end 
 
A.3 Multiple-Bridge Nodes 
k2=1; 
k3=1; 
Index=find ( TN ( 1, : ) );  
N_TN=numel ( Index ); % Number of to-be-connected neighbors 
for i=1:N-1 
for j=1:N_TN 
if ( NB_S ( i )==TTL) 
temp2 = intersect ( Keys ( i, : ), Keys ( N, : ) ); 
s ( k2 ) = numel ( temp2 ); 
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if ( s (k2) > 0 ) 
temp3 = intersect ( keys ( Index (j), : ), Keys (i , :) ); 
g ( k3 ) = numel ( temp3 ); 
if ( g ( k3 ) > 0 ) 
BN ( i , j )=1; % Multiple bridge nodes 
else 
BN ( i , j )=0; 
end 
k3 = k3+1; 
end 
k2 = k2+1; 
end 
end 
end 
 
A.4 Network Security
xc = 0.4   % Compromise capability 
temp4 = rand ( 1, N ); 
compromised = zeros ( 1, N ); 
for i=1:N 
if ( temp4 (i) < xc ) 
compromised ( i ) = 1; % Nodes compromised 
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else 
compromised ( i ) = 0; 
end 
end 
total_BN=zeros ( 1, N_TN ); 
comp_BN=zeros ( 1, N_TN); 
for i=1:N-1 
for j=1:N_TN 
if ( BN ( i , j )==1 && compromised ( i )==1 ) 
comp_BN ( j )=comp_BN ( j )+1; % Compromised BridgeNodes 
end  
end 
end 
for i=1:N-1 
for j=1:N_TN 
if ( BN ( i , j ) ==1 ) 
total_BN ( j )=total_BN ( j )+1; % Total number of BrigeNodes 
end 
end 
end 
xp= 0.5     % Compromise probability 
C_TN=0; 
 
 
46 
 
for i=1:N_TN 
if (comp_BN ( i ) / total_BN ( i ) > xp ) 
C_TN=C_TN+1;  % Total number of to-be-connected neighbors compromised 
end 
end 
 
 
